Consequently, Germany's third place position as a capital exporting economy was of considerable importance in 1914 in and of itself, but all the more so because of her rapid advance to that position in so short a period of time, which seemed to portend an even greater future advance that could well cause her to overtake France and maybe even catch up with Britain at some not far distant date. This rapid economic advance -not unlike the worrying economic expansion of Japan today -was very much on the minds of knowledgeable men at that time and may well have been a factor impelling Germany's rivals more easily to accept war in 1914 as a means of halting the onrushing German economic juggernaut 2 . Be that as it may, the war certainly did have just that effect. In the four years from 1915 to 1919, the Allied blockade terminated German foreign trade, crippled her economy, and reduced her population to near starvation; revolution in Russia and breakup of Austria-Hungary disastrously devalued German foreign investments in Europe (since most of them lay in Eastern Europe); sequestration and forced liquidation eliminated nearly all German capital holdings in the British Empire, France, and the United States; and finally confiscation of her colonies and appropriation of her merchant fleet quashed any prospect of an early return to her prewar economic position. The onrushing juggernaut had in fact been stopped in its tracks, but as much by the net of economic blockade of the Allied gladiator as by his sword.
Among this catalogue of woes, however, mention of Latin America remains conspicuously absent, for it was in Latin America that Germany aroused the most effective sentiments of sympathy and received the most considerate treatment that she was to encounter anywhere in the world outside of her immediate allies and in neutral Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland. For this reason, German investments in Latin America - 2 Ross J.S. Hoffman concludes his book on Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875 -1914 (New York 1964 ; first published in 1933) by saying: "it is quite reasonable to doubt whether Englishmen would have seen so much to detest in Germany [in 1914 ] had commercial rivalry been nonexistent. . . The British Government may stand acquitted of making war for the ends of trade, but that the anti-German orientation of the British mind and British world policy sprang chiefly from the great economic competition seems incontrovertibly proved", p. 304.
some 16% or about one-sixth of her total foreign capital outlay -passed the war for the most part unscathed (the slightly contrary cases of Guatemala, Brazil, and Peru will be touched upon below), and remained in 1918 free and unencumbered assets. That they did not seem to play a large role in Germany's economic recovery during the 1920s or have much impact on the developing Latin American economies in that decade was due to Germany's inability, for lack of financial resources at home, to renew and enlarge them, and probably more importantly to the advent during the war and the decade following of a new and overwhelming rival in the region, namely, the United States. Nevertheless, German investment in Latin America remained significant and a potential resource to Germany both economically and politically, as developments in the 1930s were to reveal. Yet notwithstanding this fact, it is surprising that the subject of German capital investment in Latin America has hitherto received so little scholarly attention, both as to its extent in 1914 and as to what happened to it during the war 3 . The following pages are therefore an attempt to elucidate some aspects of the subject: particularly, what was its total amount in 1914 and how was it distributed between the several business sectors in the twenty republics of Latin America.
First off, however, a few words must be said about the "indeterminate amount" of total German foreign investment in 1914. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I there arose a widespread desire to know the "total national wealth" of each of the European great powers. No doubt this desire was a reflection of the impressive economic growth that the industrialized nations of Europe had experienced during these boom years. At any rate, in Germany a number of statistical estimates were made, each of which obliged its author to calculate first the total amount of foreign capital holdings in order to arrive at the true total of German national wealth. But in attempting to discover the global amount of German foreign investment, it was quickly learned that there existed no current statistical source, either official or unofficial, upon which to base a secure calculation, and consequently, the statisticians were driven back a decade to 1904 to the statistical publication of the Imperial Navy Office compiled in support of a navy increase bill in the Reichstag at that time 4 .
This compilation contained a worldwide review of German foreign investment which was based on consular reports and which therefore had the earmark of official data. Not without some sophistication it divided German foreign holdings into two categories: direct investment wherein the investor or investors directly controlled their investment, and passive investment in income-producing securities wherein the investor relinquished control over his capital to some corporation or governmental body (p. XI). The total value of direct investment was given as between 8,0 and 9,2 milliard marks, and that of passive investment in securities was given as at least 16 milliard (pp. 173 and 179) which when added to the former made a grand total of from 24,0 to 25,2 milliard marks.
While a number of authorities thereupon accepted the figure of about 25 milliard as a minimum for German foreign investment in 1904, and for In contrast to Helfferich, however, a number of rather detailed contemporary studies devoted specifically to the subject of German foreign investment (Helfferich's estimate after all was only incidental to his main purpose of calculating the total national wealth and was arrived at in most cursory fashion, as his text makes plain) were made before, during, and immediately after the war, and these studies generally agree that although Helfferich was correct to some extent in regard to the fact that some of the direct foreign investment was held in the form of securities, still he based himself on a decade-old compilation of uncertain reliability and moreover did not allow for a large amount of foreign capital in German hands that simply escaped the ken of consular reportage. These thorough-going scholarly studies place the global figure for German foreign investment in 1914 at around 30 milliard marks 8 . the Allied countries; they put the global figure for German foreign capital holdings in 1914 at 28 milliard marks 9 . This would translate into a figure of nearly 6.700 million dollars in pre-war values (4,2 marks to the dollar); it is the figure I believe is most reasonably and securely based on financial sources, and consequently is the figure used in this article.
Yet notwithstanding its reliable character, the Report of the Second Committee of Experts has remained a rather obscure official document with little influence on scholarly study of the subject until recently. Instead, the book by Herbert Feis, Europe the World's Banker, , which appeared in 1930, became the standard general work on pre-war foreign investment and has remained the principal source of information and statistics for most writing on international investment since its publication 10 . An indication of the degree of its influence is the fact that the studies on foreign investment in Latin America conducted by the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s rely directly on Feis for their data on, and discussions of the subject prior to 1914 n . And for Latin America, these UN studies have become a basic authority frequently quoted.
Feis's book, therefore, has become fundamental to most all subsequent scholarly writing on foreign investment and not without good cause, for his was in fact the first work which brought together and analyzed the concurrent development of British, French, and German capital export in the period prior to World War I. However, with regard to his statistics on German capital export, Feis appears to rely nearly exclusively on Helfferich (1913), Stamp (1919) , and Moulton and McGuire (1923) ; the only one of the German studies that he seems to have consulted is Lenz (1922) , although one cannot be exactly certain whom he did consult because he gives no bibliography. But given the sources he does cite, it should not be surprising that Feis puts the global figure for German foreign investment in 1914 somewhat on the low side at from 22 to 25 milliard marks. Also in the 1930s there appeared the comprehensive study of international investment by the Royal Institute of International Affairs which put German foreign capital holdings in 1914 at 25 milliard marks. But it cites only Feis as its source (again with no bibliography) and does not devote much attention to the German scene 12 . By contrast, another study published in 1935 by University of Chicago professor Eugene Staley was in fact the most thorough-going treatment of the statistics and bibliography on foreign investment up to its publication and equally so for Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and the rest 13 . The data on Germany is drawn from nearly all the previously published studies in German and otherwise. But unfortunately Staley's work seems to have remained unnoticed on the sidelines of scholarship; for example, the UN publications are not aware of it. Only more recently has it been cited and its more reliable figure of 6.700 million dollars (28 milliard marks) brought into the arena of scholarly consideration 14 .
In Germany it seems that the figure of 31 milliard marks has been recently advanced as the best approximation to the total of German foreign investment in 1914 17 One such primary financial source would be the registration of foreign securities with the Reichsbank which the German government ordered on August 23, 1916, and which resulted in a total nominal value of registered securities in the amount of 16.248 milliard marks and which revealed moreover that about 2 milliard marks worth of securities had been sold abroad since August 1914. Thus at the beginning of the war the total nominal value of German holdings of foreign securities was something over 18 milliard marks. But since the registration decree was quite obviously a prelude to forced sale of at least some of these holdings, it seems hard not to believe that those who could escape the registration would do so, which consequently would mean that the 18 milliard total in 1914 is most likely an understatement. Nonetheless, this firm minimum figure of 18 milliard marks would tend strongly to confirm the calculated estimate of 20 to 21 milliard as a total for The problem with these figures is how did Feis arrive at them. Unless he was privy to material that no one else has since seen or heard of (not very likely), his distribution figures probably derive in some manner from the only other analysis of the geographical distribution of German foreign investment before 1914, namely, that of the Imperial Navy Office of 1904. But that analysis only applied to direct investment (as reported by German consuls around the world), and it left Europe entirely out (presumably because the intent was to stress the overseas expansion of German economic activity in support of the navy increase bill). Nevertheless, its published figures are worth recapitulating here because they are a bedrock upon which any analysis of geographical distribution from published German sources must rest:
19 Feis, p. 74: "the material for this table was drawn from a large variety of sources, mentioned in later chapters where the financing of various areas is discussed"; but upon examination, it is very hard to determine which of the sources mentioned he in fact drew upon. 
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If one takes the mean between the low and high Latin American totals (2.880-3.350), i.e., 3.115 million marks, and adds it to the estimate of German holdings of Latin American securities in 1904, i.e., 750 million marks (p. 180), to arrive at a total Latin American investment of 3.865 million marks, and then divides this Latin American total by the mean of the grand total of all German foreign investment in 1904, i.e., 24.615 million (8.030-9.200 or 8.615 plus 16.000 million), one finds that the Latin American total is 15,7% of the grand total. Feis's corresponding figure works out to 16,17% (whence Staley's 16,2%), and therefore is arrived at by some different route which I at this point am unable to divine! But the order of magnitude of the two percentages is very close. Unfortunately, a comparision of the corresponding percentages of the other regions enumerated does not in every case yield figures as nearly identical as in the case of Latin America, which simply means that Feis's figures for the geographical distribution of German foreign investment in 1914 are at least not directly derived from the Imperial Navy Office figures of 1904 21 . Nevertheless, the close similarity in the percentages for Latin America and some of the other regions of the world does give some degree of substantiation to Feis's 3,8 milliard marks as the total of German foreign investment in Latin America in 1914. Failing any other geographical analyses, that figure will have to stand for the present.
In this connection, it is worth pointing out that the 16% of total German foreign investment placed in Latin America compares with a rough 18,5% for Britain and with a rather uncertain 17,7% for France; about 19,6% of total world foreign investment was placed in Latin America in 1914 22 .
Hereafter, we must cross the Atlantic and turn to Latin American sources if we are to procede further with this inquiry.
Unfortunately, because of the more fragmented and less frequent compilations of financial data in the twenty Latin American republics of that era, the yield of information on German capital investment from these sources has been very incomplete and uncertain. Indeed, none of the Latin American writings on the subject have contributed anything really new to the information known from German sources 23 . The study of Pablo Minelli (1939), the first in Latin America to attempt coverage of all foreign investment in the whole region, is really based on Feis via the study of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (see note 12 above) even though his figures are slightly lower than those of his sources (5.170 million dollars instead of 5.900 million for Germany's total foreign investment; 836 million dollars instead of 900 million for her total Latin American investment) 24 . Therefore, Minelli cannot be counted as an attempt to arrive at a total regional figure from Latin American sources. That attempt, interestingly enough, was in fact made by North Americans.
Their motivation in doing so was to determine exactly what was the extent and nature of foreign investment in Latin America so as to be better able to support and encourage American investment in the region while Europe was absent and otherwise engaged, as it were, fighting the First World War. As is well known, from the outset of the war the European belligerents were increasingly unable to continue to supply their customers in Latin America with manufactured goods, which dearth of supply allowed the United States to step into the vacuum and literally take over tor, and he discusses both domestic and foreign investment in the context of its contribution to the economic development of each one of the twenty Latin American republics. Consequently, although Halsey is a splendid source for ascertaining the investment situation in any particular business sector in any country in Latin America as of World War I, he does not provide anything like systematic information that would enable one to calculate the German contribution by itself 30 .
For that, we must turn to the people most interested and determined in finding out just those businesses and investments in Latin America that were indeed German: I refer here to the U. This "war board" immediately set to work to identify and blacklist all enemy and ally of enemy businesses in Latin America. Its first "Enemy Trading List", or blacklist as it was commonly known, was published in December 1917 and consisted entirely of firms in the twenty Latin American republics. A second revised and enlarged list was published in March 1918; it broadened coverage to include firms in nine European neutral countries. A third and final list was published in December 1918 (after the armistice); it still concentrated on Latin America adding only the Dutch West Indies to make a total coverage of 30 countries. The U.S. blacklist remained in force, along with the other Allied blacklists, until April 29, 1919, i.e., for a period of about 18 months 32 .
During this period of time, the War Trade Board through its Bureau of War Trade Intelligence vigorously sought out all information available in different government departments in Washington, e.g., State Department consular reports, Navy Department intelligence, Commerce Department files on foreign trade and foreign firms, as well as sending out its own Foreign Agents, first and foremost to Latin America, to identify enemy and ally of enemy firms. It must not be thought, however, that the War Trade Board was overzealous or indiscriminate in blacklisting firms. Rather, it had to balance its immediate purpose of prosecuting the war against the Administration's long-range ambition of expanding U.S. trade. And in fact, many of the German import houses in Latin America had long been buyers of American goods, and particularly big buyers during the period of U.S. neutrality, so to blacklist them meant in many cases cutting off one's own trade. Consequently, the War Trade Board was ready and willing to remove firms from the blacklist, and did so, when it could be shown that despite a German background, such and such a firm was not now trading with the enemy; the same applied a fortiori to local Latin American firms and to firms owned by neutrals 33 .
The "country specialists" in the War Trade Board's Bureau of War Trade Intelligence, therefore, became probably the most inforiped people in the world at that time as to which firms were thoroughly German in ownership and sympathy and prepared to continue contact with Germany despite the consequences of being blacklisted, and which firms were "Latin American" (even though they may have been owned and run by persons of German background) in the sense that their primary loyalty was to the nation in which they resided. In a rough way, therefore, the blacklist separated out those who were "nationally German" from those who were or had become bona fide citizens of the country in which they lived. The latter, for the most part, cannot be considered as representing German overseas investment in Latin America. This document, therefore, is based on all the information that a powerful and vigorous government can gather and, in consequence, is a premier primary source on the subject. It not only gives figures for each Latin American country, but also breaks these down into six different business categories, and on account of this breakdown one can determine more precisely than heretofore the proportion of direct investment to passive investment (about one-third to two-thirds as will be shown below). Furthermore, the document yields the extra benefit of listing the value of the ships interned in Latin American ports during the war. Although the value of these ships, of course, is not to be considered a part of German foreign investment in Latin America, this item gives a good idea of the relative size of the loss sustained by Germany in having to turn over her merchant marine to the Allies as required by the armistice and subsequent peace treaty.
The amounts enumerated in the document are "actual findings", that is to say, minimum verifyable totals of German capital holdings. There are a number of businesses cited in the document as known German operations (mostly commercial businesses) for which no capitalization figures are given, because they simply could not be ascertained. And the same applied to the capitalization of innumerable other small businesses which were too insignificant to list. After all, the purpose of the document was to establish the size of the "big fish" for possible reparations payments, not to enumerate the petty holdings of the "small fry". Such problems as the values of German interests transferred "to a neutral interest during the war to cover such ownership could not be determined upon within the scope of our inquiry" (p. 7), but this omission is probably offset by the cases, not infrequent, where local Latin American capital was invested together with German capital in an enterprise (usually, again, a commercial enterprise). In these cases the percentage of German capital has not been extracted out, so "wherever an enemy interest has been fairly shown to exist in any firm or corporation, the entire capital investment in such organization has been tabulated" (p. 7).
But, "there ought to be no question of the figures on public utilities, banks, ranches and plantations, mines and government bonds, because fairly accurate statistics exist, in general, which support the conclusion reached" (p. 7).
The values are in undepreciated pre-war U.S. dollars (p. 7). The precise time of valuation is somewhat ambiguous, but it was the intention of the document to give "actual values" at the time of the peace negotiations in Paris, which for historical convenience we may take for the end of 1918. The document's figures are recapitulated in the table on page 239.
In considering these figures, first off one should subtract the total for "ships interned" from the grand total to arrive at a minimum verifyable total of German investment in Latin America of nearly 700 million dollars, which, when converted into marks at the pre-war rate of 4,2 marks to the dollar, yields a figure of 2,92 milliard marks as of the end of 1918. It should be stressed again that this is a minimum total of actual findings. The document goes on to say: "This figure being taken as reasonably accurate after an investigation of a few weeks, no one can deny that the real German investment, to be disclosed upon more careful investigation, would be several times this amount. The stocks of raw materials accumulated by German interests during the period of the European war for after war use has [sic] been assumed by competent authority to reach large figures. Little evidence of this item is shown in our report nor could it be reasonably expected. The amount of credits in bills of exchange et cetera, must reach a very large sum. It need not be stated that this question was quite outside the scope of our inquiry. If we multiply the actual findings by three, no one, I think, would deny that the basis of our estimate is conservative in the extreme. Therefore it is a reasonable deduction that the total amount of German holdings in Latin America, which would be disclosed upon careful investigation under such means as the associated Governments may possess through international finance, would be upwards of two billions of dollars" (p. 9).
Notwithstanding the "extremely conservative basis" of the document's estimated totals, most probably one should take a position of some reserve regarding them, for although German investment in Latin America was surely more than the minimum of the actual findings, and possibly much more, still an overall estimate of 2.000 million dolars (8.4 milliard marks) seems overly large (possibly a reflection of war psychology which provokes one to magnify the power of one's enemy) when compared with the other calculated estimates made from German sources: at most 5,6 milliard marks 36 . But aside from the admittedly subjective column of estimated totals, this compilation of the War Trade Board represents the only serious attempt to count up from firm financial sources all the German investments in Latin America at that time. Its actual findings, amounting to a total of nearly 700 million dollars, or 2,92 milliard marks, is therefore an irreducible minimum which gives credence to Feis's calculated estimate of 3,8 milliard marks in 1914.
It also allows a calculation of the relative percentage of direct investment to passive investment: direct investment being nearly exclusively represented in the table by the categories, commercial houses, mines, and plantations and ranches. The total of these three columns is 35,2% of the grand total (omitting "ships interned"). Therefore, on the other side of the coin, German ownership of passive income-producing securities that did not allow for control over the investment, i.e., government bonds, banks, and public utilities, amounted to 64,8% of the total actual findings of German investment in Latin America. This is roughly a one-third / two-thirds split between direct and passive investment; indeed it is interesting to note that investment in government securities alone amounted to 32,6% or nearly a third of total investment. These proportions, finally, are a healthy corrective to the lop-sided and improbable proportions implied by the Imperial Navy Office's compilation of 1904 37 .
We may conclude, then, by setting our own estimate for German capital holdings in Latin America in 1914 at around 4,5 milliard marks or 1.100 million dollars 38 , with some 1,5 milliard marks in direct investment and the remaining 3,0 milliard in passive income-producing securities. There still is one other authority to consider on German investment in Latin America, whom I have purposely left until after discussing the War Trade Board's compilation because his figures, strangely, are even less than those of the latter. The said authority is J. Fred Rippy, author of numerous scholarly works on Latin American history, and especially in the late 1940s and 1950s towards the end of his career, the author of several studies on European investment in Latin America 39 . He addressed himself particularly to German investment in three articles published in 1947/48, the last of which, his "German Investments in Latin America", is really the only monographic treatment of the subject in English to date (see note 3 above). Based on U.S. government and Latin American sources, it arrives at a global figure for German investment in Latin America in 1918 of 677 million dollars (p. 64). This total is peculiarly out of line with the 900 million dollar estimate of Feis (whom Rippy dismisses as "apparently only dimly aware Latin America is also a part of the world" (p. 63, n. 1)), and with the even larger figures that would be consistent with the higher world investment totals of the other German authorities cited above.
Rippy really gives no specific sources for his figures, saying in a footnote that they "are based upon consultations with several officials of both the United States and Latin America and upon government documents and other publications too numerous to cite in detail here" (p. 63, n. 2). But he does go on to cite a number of Commerce Department publications, including Halsey's Investments in Latin America, none of which give really systematic data that would allow one confidently to compile country-by-country totals of German investment, as he has done. I suspect, therefore, that he has pieced together his figures from the spotty data on German holdings in these Commerce Department (mostly Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce) studies and supplemented them amply with consultations with U.S. and Latin American government of- ficials. In any event, his country-by-country figures are wildly out of line with the War Trade Board's figures, and it seems little more than a fortuitous coincidence that his total for Latin America as a whole is relatively close to the War Trade Board's minimum total, albeit below it (see table below). I must conclude therefore that as far as Rippy's figures for the amounts of German investment got, they are simply unreliable and much too low. Finally, in closing, there remains outstanding only the matter of what happened to the various German holdings in Latin America during the war. The general impression, of course, is that they suffered considerable 
